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TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES
ON AN INTERNATIONAL AND STATE PLATFORM:
A CONTROVERSIAL RESOLUTION
TO NORTH DAKOTA’S DEVILS LAKE DILEMMA
I.

INTRODUCTION
“The best that can be said of the U.S.-Canadian deal on Devils Lake is
that it may prove better than no deal at all.
Or it may not.”1

The United States and Canada share a sweeping expanse of waterways
that splash across the respective borders of both countries.2 Long before
political boundaries were drawn separating the two nations, massive
glaciers carved out what would later become some of the largest freshwater
lakes in the world.3 Now, twenty thousand years after the last of these
glaciers retreated, these lakes and waterways have become a critical turning
point in international and state law.4 Attempts to resolve transboundary
water disputes among parties of heterogeneous make-ups, including
sovereign nations, states, and public and private groups, are proving to be
increasingly complicated, necessitating the navigation of a myriad of laws,
treaties, policies, and agreements in order to determine the applicable
jurisdictional and legal framework to be used in their resolution.5
The long-standing conflict between both the United States and Canada,
as well as between North Dakota and Minnesota, over the ever-expanding
Devils Lake in central North Dakota is an excellent example of such a
multi-faceted transboundary dispute.6 It would be difficult to find a more
complicated conflict involving so many different parties, jurisdictions, and

1. Editorial, Devils Lake; Settlement Looks Like Surrender, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Aug. 11, 2005, at 16A.
2. See John Knox, Federal, State and Provincial Interplay Regarding Cross-Border
Environmental Pollution, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 199, 203 (2001) (explaining that Canada and the
United States share a border approximately 5,000 miles long).
3. See Kendall Hamilton & Kimberly Martineau, The 100-Year Forecast: Very Hot, and
Stormy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1997, at 12 (explaining the change of weather patterns over time
and its corollary effect on societal relationships).
4. See Knox, supra note 2, at 203 (discussing the effects of transboundary pollution).
5. Id. at 203-04.
6. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A.
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components of federal and state law.7 For more than fourteen years,
attempts to curtail the expansion and flooding of Devils Lake have been a
source of contention for the respective governments, as well as for many
additional parties, both public and private.8 Not surprisingly, in spite of a
recent agreement between the governments of Manitoba and North Dakota
on August 5, 2005,9 that may lead, in substance, to a temporary resolution
of the long-running Devils Lake dilemma,10 a residue of discontent remains
for many of the engaged parties.
This Note will provide a substantive review of the legal ramifications
of international and state-level transboundary water disputes, with reference
specifically to the flooding of Devils Lake. The discussion involved in this
Note will focus on the following: (1) the relevant environmental law
legislation as applied on a state and federal level; (2) the controlling
international treaty law; and (3) the possible ameliorative remedies of state
nuisance law. The North Dakota Supreme Court’s June 2005 decision in
People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Department of
Health (hereinafter People)11 will serve as the center point for the discussion of each area of law as it pertains to the case. After considering the
implications and/or applications of each area of law, this Note will analyze
the rights and remedies of those substantive areas of law as they pertain to
international and state transboundary water disputes. Finally, this Note will
attempt to justify the North Dakota Department of Health’s decision to
build an outlet from Devils Lake into the nearby Sheyenne River to protect
North Dakota’s citizens from harm, while at the same time outlining
broader public policy issues inherent in making large-scale changes to our
natural environment.

7. See Knox, supra note 2, at 200-02 (indicating that despite the relative frequency of
transboundary water pollution disputes, a situation involving multiple states, as well as both
Canada and the United States, is an infrequent occurrence).
8. Dean Rebuffoni, North Dakota Flood-Control Plan Is Under Fire, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), May 9, 1997, at 22A.
9. Press Release, State of N.D., Office of the Governor, Joint Press Statement on Devils Lake
Flooding and Ecological Protection by the United States and Canada, North Dakota, Minnesota,
and Manitoba 1-2 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://governor.state.nd.us./media/newsreleases/2005/08/050806.html [hereinafter Press Release]. See generally Clifford Krauss, U.S.
and Canada Reach Deal on Draining Lake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, § 1, at 17 (explaining the
background and concept of the agreement).
10. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1.
11. 2005 ND 104, 697 N.W.2d 319.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE DEVILS LAKE DILEMMA
A. RISING WATER AND FLOODS
Devils Lake, with a surface area of over 125,000 acres, is the largest
freshwater lake in North Dakota.12 As a part of the Hudson River Basin,
the lake is located in an isolated ecosystem that allows for little or no
natural drainage.13 Much like the Great Salt Lake in Utah, the lack of any
natural outflow leads to high levels of salinity in the water.14 Additionally,
the lake is prone to drastic variations in water levels.15 Since the 1990s, the
lake has risen more than twenty-four feet, bringing water levels to their
highest point since the 1830s,16 and expanding the surface area of the lake
from seventy square miles to its current size of 125,000 acres.17
The resulting flooding has destroyed over 80,000 acres of farmland,
homes, and businesses.18 Consequently, the lake’s natural borders have
increased to the point where they have begun to displace residents living
outside the City of Devils Lake.19 In 1996, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency implemented a buyout program for many of the
residents who lived in flooded areas.20 While some of the residents have
12. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 2, 697 N.W.2d at 323.
13. John Knox, Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on
Multiple Actors in Canada–U.S. Relations: Cleveland, Ohio, April 16-18, 2004: Environment:
Garrison Dam, Columbia River, The IJC, NGOS, 30 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 129, 130 (2004).
14. See Sheryl A. Rosenberg, A Canadian Perspective on the Devils Lake Outlet: Towards
an Environmental Assessment Model for Transboundary Disputes, 76 N.D. L. REV. 817, 821
(2000) (providing a wealth of helpful information regarding the facts and issues of the conflict that
took place, in large part, in the 1990s).
15. Id.
16. Id. See also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CORPS FACTS: DEVILS LAKE, N.D.
FLOOD REDUCTION PROJECT—OUTLET 1 (2005), available at http://www.mvp.usace.army.
mil/docs/press/devilsoutlet.pdf [hereinafter U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), CLOSED BASIN LAKE
FLOODING—INTERIM FINAL RULE, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/fnlrlcbl.shtm (last visited
October 13, 2006) [hereinafter FEMA Report]. The FEMA report explained the need for a
federal buyout program:
The conditions at Devils Lake Basin are unique because the lake is part of a "closed
basin," that is, although it lies within the Red River-Hudson Bay drainage system, no
water has flowed from the Devils Lake Basin in recorded history (since the
1830s) . . . . The runoff remains in these two lakes until it evaporates or enters the
groundwater table . . . . We (the Mitigation Division) are adding an endorsement to
the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) that will establish a permanent procedure
for honoring claims for buildings damaged by continuous lake flooding from closed
basin lakes or under imminent threat of flood damage from those closed basin
lakes . . . . We estimate that, by being proactive, rather than waiting for an insured
building to be inundated for 90 days by the rising lake levels, we have saved the
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taken advantage of the program, many have remained despite the increased
risks of flooding and the lack of any foreseeable improvement of the
situation.21
Since the beginning of the precipitous rise in lake water levels during
the early 1990s, efforts to control water levels have cost the State of North
Dakota and the federal government over $350 million in damage relief.22 In
1993, the North Dakota Water Commission, in an effort to reduce the
damage caused by frequent floods and rising water levels, asked the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter the Corps) to conduct a
comprehensive study on the creation and cost of an outlet from Devils Lake
to an outside body of water.23 The Corps began the study in 1997.24 The
resulting plan was later approved in 2003.25 The Corps recommended the
construction of an outlet at nearby Pelican Lake, which empties into the
Sheyenne River, under the stipulation that North Dakota adhere to the
Clean Water Act’s permit program26 and effluent limitations standards.27
Furthermore, the Corps estimated that an additional $900 million in
potential damages might occur if the lake continued to rise to the point of
overflowing into the Sheyenne River,28 with the greatest impact falling on
the City of Devils Lake and its surrounding highways.29 The cost of implementing the Corps’ outlet plan was estimated to be around $200 million.30
Despite the high cost, the Corps’ final integrated planning report states that

program on average 25% for each claim in the Devils Lake area. Paying in advance
for these inevitable flood losses so that policyholders can use the claim proceeds to
relocate their homes so that we can recover salvage simply makes the best public
policy and insurance sense under the circumstances.
Id.
21. Id.
22. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 16, at 1.
23. Id.
24. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 4, 697
N.W.2d 319, 323.
25. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT/
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR DEVILS LAKE, NORTH DAKOTA, 1-4 (2003),
available at http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/docs/14sp292recordofdec.pdf [hereinafter ARMY
CORPS FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT]. The Army Corps’ plan was approved on the
condition that North Dakota applied for and was granted a Clean Water Act § 1342 permit, and
met effluent limitation standards of § 1311. Id.
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (explaining the state permit program and its requirements).
27. See id. § 1311 (explaining the effluent limitation standards and requirements).
28. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 16, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Knox, supra note 13, at 133.
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the Corps’ plan “is the least environmentally damaging practicable outlet
alternative.”31
The Corps plan was never implemented.32 In 1999, the North Dakota
Legislature passed a bill33 that effectively rejected the Corps plan in favor
of a more cost-effective and immediate solution, allowing the construction
of an outlet to the Sheyenne River which would cost the state under $30
million to build.34 The Sheyenne River outlet will relieve pressure from the
lake by pumping water from the lake to the Sheyenne River at a rate of 100
cubic feet per second.35 This second plan remains controversial for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the arguments made by the adverse parties in
People.36
The recent ruling by the North Dakota Supreme Court in People effectively closed the door on the likelihood of further litigation.37 In People,
Manitoba, joined by two environmental interest groups,38 appealed the
district court’s decision, which upheld the North Dakota Department of
Health’s decision to grant the Water Commission a permit for the creation
of the Sheyenne River outlet.39 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the Health Department failed to conduct the permit
process in accordance with the law, and paid deference to the administrative
agency’s decision-making process.40
Explaining its decision, the court reasoned that the Health Department
had conducted a permit hearing and received public comments concerning
the outlet as required by law.41 Furthermore, applying the deferential “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” standard of review, the North Dakota
Supreme Court also found that the Health Department had sufficiently considered and addressed the issues concerning the transfer of harmful biota
from Devils Lake into the waters connected to the Sheyenne River outlet.42
31. ARMY CORPS FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
32. Id.
33. See Statewide Water Development Goals, 1999 N.D. Laws 535, § 3 (codified as N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-01-26.2 (2005)) (explaining the sources of funding for the Devils Lake outlet,
and requiring approval by the North Dakota Water Commission for the project).
34. Knox, supra note 13, at 134.
35. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 14, ¶ 6, 697
N.W.2d 319, 324.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323. Manitoba was joined by two public interest parties: People
to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. and the Peterson Coulee Outlet Association. Id. Additionally,
the Minnesota Attorney General joined the appellants as Amicus Curiae. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 38, 697 N.W.2d at 333.
41. Id.
42. Id. ¶ 37.
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Though potentially harmful foreign biota were undoubtedly present within
the “closed” water system of Devils Lake, the court deferred to the North
Dakota Department of Health’s decision.43
The decision in People, effectively paving the way for the construction
of the proposed outlet,44 was followed by an agreement between North
Dakota and Canada regarding the maintenance and construction of the
outlet.45 On August 5, 2005, two months after the decision in People,
Manitoba and North Dakota agreed to cooperate with the newly proposed
design of the Devils Lake outlet, which put an end to the conflict, at least
for Manitoba.46 While the negotiation efforts should be applauded, the
agreement appears to leave Minnesota and other interested parties in the
dark concerning further legal recourse.47
B. THE CONFLICT: WHAT IS AT STAKE?
It is commonly agreed by all parties involved that the situation at
Devils Lake has reached critical proportions.48 The disagreement lies in the
proposed solutions to this calamity.49 On one side stand the State of North
Dakota and the federal government in the form of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.50 On
the other side are the government of Manitoba, various American and
Canadian public interest groups,51 and the State of Minnesota.52 The
crossfire in the media has been palpable.53
43. Id.
44. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
45. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Knox, supra note 13, at 133. Knox discusses the post held by former Secretary of State
Colin Powell, and his decision that the North Dakota outlet plans would not violate the Boundary
Waters Treaty, which naturally pleased Governor John Hoeven. Id. As of the writing of this
Note, the current Secretary of State is Condoleezza Rice. U.S. Dep’t of State, http://
www.state.gov/secretary/ (last visited April 30, 2006).
51. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 1, 697
N.W.2d 319, 323.
52. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1, People to Save the Sheyenne River, 2005 ND 104, 697 N.W.2d 319
(No. 20040376). The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, and the Minnesota Attorney General appeared as Amici Curiae to argue that the
Sheyenne River outlet would result in the transfer of potentially harmful biota and invasive
parasites to Minnesota waterways, which would violate Minnesota water quality standards. Id. at
8-11.
53. See Frank McKenna, Hell from High Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at A27.
Ambassador McKenna’s position summarized the concerns of Manitoba and Canada, stating, “In
Canada, we are sympathetic to the plight of the lake’s neighbors, but not to the solution their state
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The disagreement stems from the adverse parties’ concerns that the
Sheyenne River outlet will introduce foreign biota and other environmentally harmful water into the river, which will in turn infect the waters of
Lake Winnipeg and the Nelson River system, both part of the Hudson Bay
watershed leading to the Atlantic Ocean.54 The salty waters of Devils Lake
have high concentrations of nitrogen, sulfates, phosphates, and minerals
“that could cause severe digestive distress if consumed and could be lethal
to aquatic life.”55 Therefore, the water quality in Devils Lake is arguably
much lower than the water quality in the Red River and Lake Winnipeg,
and the parties against the outlet maintain that the concentrations of certain
water quality parameters exceed relevant water quality standards.56
Furthermore, there is a concern regarding the potential for biota transfer
from Devils Lake to the rest of the Red River basin, largely because of
indications that there has been no significant exchange of water between the
Devils Lake sub-basin and the rest of the Red River basin for nearly 1,800
years.57
Many of the concerns that had persisted since the planned construction
of the Pelican Lake outlet by the Army Corps continued to be debated until
the August 2005 agreement between Manitoba and North Dakota.58 The
parties opposing the outlet argued that the addition of Devils Lake water
into the Red River system posed a potential threat to commercial and sport
fisheries in the waters connected to the Hudson Bay basin.59 Furthermore,
Manitoba estimates “[t]he total direct and indirect annual value of the Lake
Winnipeg and Red River commercial and sport fishery to the Manitoba
economy [to be] nearly [$50 million (Canadian)].”60
Concerns over water degradation are very real, and yet the solutions to
those concerns must be weighed against the right of North Dakota to protect
its citizens.61 Conversely, the struggle over how to properly balance North
has proposed.” Id. ¶ 2. But see Gov. John Hoeven, North Dakota Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2005, at A24. In response, North Dakota Governor John Hoeven summarized the position of
North Dakota on the issue: “Canada is opposing our efforts to bring relief to our people.” Id. ¶ 4.
“North Dakota will not jeopardize its unblemished record of environmental responsibility for the
Devils Lake outlet or any other project.” Id.
54. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 818.
55. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.
56. GOV’T OF MANITOBA, MANITOBA’S CONCERNS: GARRISON–DAKOTA WATER
RESOURCES ACT AND DEVILS LAKE OUTLET 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/
waterstewardship/transboundary/positions/man-position/backgr.html.
57. Id.
58. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2.
59. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 818.
60. Id. (citing Information Bulletin, Gov’t Of Manitoba and North Dakota Views,
http://www.gov.mb.ca/environ/pagesnews/devlake/ib000403.html) (first alteration in original).
61. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24.
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Dakota’s use of its police powers to help its own citizens is weighed heavily
against the interest of such parties as Manitoba to protect their waters from
pollution.62
III. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL AND
STATE-LEVEL REGULATION
International and inter-state transboundary disputes over environmental
pollution, such as the one involving Devils Lake, arise fairly often, and their
resolution is almost always complicated.63 Perhaps the leading factor
contributing to the overall complexity is the question of jurisdictional
authority: Who has authority to make decisions, the federal government or
the individual states?64 Additionally, to whom should these decisions be
appealed?65 Although a system of cooperative federalism exists in the
United States to confront this issue, the answers to these questions are not
entirely clear. 66
A. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: FEDERAL-LEVEL REGULATION
Water pollution can, and often does, cross international political
boundaries.67 As a result, transboundary water disputes are not new to the
judicial systems of the United States and Canada.68 Though a variety of
different arguments are often made on both sides, the questions that consistently arise in most cases are the following: how much pollution is
enough; who regulates it; and how?69 In the oft-cited Trail Smelter decisions of the 1930s, the federal government tried to answer some of these
questions.70 The essential holding of the Trail Smelter decisions is that in

62. Id.
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931,
932 (1997) (explaining that when pollution which originates in one state makes its way to the
bordering state, both jurisdictions have trouble regulating it effectively).
64. Id. at 932-33
65. Id.
66. Id. at 932. Merrill explains the inherent problems with a cooperative federalism system:
“Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in
environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for
that trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.” Id.
67. Id.
68. See generally Neil S. Kagan, Great Lakes Commentary: Building On The Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement: The Next 25 Years, 1998 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 37,
40-45 (1998) (discussing the history between the United States and Canada in regards to the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, its enforcement, and the problems and solutions created over
time).
69. Merrill, supra note 63, at 932.
70. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938); see Austen L. Parrish,
Trail Smelter Deju Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for
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any transboundary dispute, no country has the right to use its territory or to
allow its territory to be used in a way that causes serious injury to the
territory of another.71 The rationale laid forth in these decisions continues
to serve as the basis for most transboundary dispute resolutions.72
However, unlike traditional American jurisprudence, where common
law, statutes, and constitutional provisions provide a relatively clear
framework for the operation of environmental regulation, international law
depends largely on negotiations and political relationships to define the
rights and responsibilities of the states.73 For the most part, international
law operates with little procedural hierarchy, and many times it does not
give any court or agency legal authority over another.74 Because of these
inherent problems, the channels and procedures for proper dispute resolution are unusually cloudy.75 When dealing with international transboundary
pollution problems, it is often only to treaty law that one can turn for
solutions to these difficult questions.76
In the Devils Lake dispute, the germane international treaty law is the
Boundary Waters Treaty (hereinafter BWT) of 1909.77 The BWT created
an agreement between the United States and Great Britain, including the
sovereign nation of Canada.78 The BWT states that both nations agree to
work amicably toward the resolution of all international transboundary
disputes in regards to pollution in all “navigable waters.”79 Additionally,
the BWT created the International Joint Commission (hereinafter IJC), the
controlling international administrative body overseeing all transboundary
water disputes between the United States and Canada.80 The BWT has been
used to help solve many transboundary water disputes between Canada and

Solutions to Canadian–U.S. Transboundary Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 364, & n.1
(2005) (explaining that the Trail Smelter Arbitrations between the United States and Canada in the
1930s required a Canadian company operating the Trail Smelter to cease causing damage to the
State of Washington).
71. Parrish, supra note 70, at 364, & n.1.
72. Id. at 364.
73. Merrill, supra note 63, at 934.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
78. Id. at Preamble. In 1909, Great Britain was the sovereign of Canada. Id.
79. Id. at Preliminary Article. “For the purpose of this treaty boundary waters are defined as
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or the
portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the
Dominion of Canada passes.” Id.
80. Id. at Article IV.
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the United States since its inception;81 however, in the Devils Lake conflict,
the IJC has not, as of the writing of this Note, been asked to review the
case.82 Without an obvious recourse to treaty law, Manitoba, Minnesota,
and the other interested parties were forced to turn to federal environmental
statutes for answers.83
1.

Federal Statutory Regulation

The federal government of the United States, in the form of the EPA,
uses statutory provisions to regulate most areas of environmental law.84 In
the Devils Lake dispute, there are two essential statutes that come into play:
(1) the Clean Water Act (CWA); 85 and (2) the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA).86 Enacted in 1969, NEPA was the first major
statutory provision created by the federal government that had a significant
impact on environmental pollution.87 Soon after the passage of NEPA, the
CWA was passed in 1972.88
Together, the enactment of NEPA and the CWA ushered in a
previously unknown era of environmental protection for the collective
waters of the United States.89 The CWA declares that “[t]he objective of
this Act is to restore and maintain the . . . biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters [and] [i]n order to achieve this objective it is hereby
declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act . . . it is the national
policy that the discharge of . . . pollutants . . . be prohibited.”90 The use of
such expansive language exemplifies the all-encompassing vision shared by
both NEPA and the CWA, and, consequently, they bestow upon the federal

81. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 841 (explaining that “[t]he factual record appears to
bear out the view that the IJC has been successful in acting as an impartial and independent body
making principled decisions”).
82. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. However, pursuant to the August 2005 agreement, the
IJC will appoint the International Red River Board to implement a shared risk management
strategy for the greater Red River basin. Press Release, supra note 10, at 2.
83. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 840.
84. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 2 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that “[e]nvironmental law has grown from a sparse set of
common law precedents and local ordinances to encompass a vast body of national legislation”).
85. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
86. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
87. See generally Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away
of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 245, 246 (2000) (applauding Congress’s enactment of NEPA, but expressing skepticism about
its long-term effectiveness).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
89. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569, 784 (discussing both statutes’
impact on modern environmental regulation).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
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government significant powers of regulation in any water pollution
dispute.91
2.

International Disputes: State Level Regulation

Though states are also bound by international treaty law, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives states the
right of decisional autonomy and the power to regulate through their own
state laws.92 Naturally, this dynamic creates a conflict of enforcement. 93
Congress gives the EPA the power to regulate through environmental
statutes, but individual states often desire their own decision-making
authority.94 This conflict is, at least in theory, solved by a system of
cooperative federalism.95 Under such a system, the EPA allows states to
regulate their pollution problems, with the EPA keeping a watchful eye
from above.96 However, complications inevitably arise when the impetus
behind the creation of the law interferes with the law’s enforcement.97
Because of these reasons, the body of laws governing cross-state pollution
remains nearly as undeveloped as those laws governing international
transboundary pollution.98
B. TRANSBOUNDARY DISPUTES: STATE VERSUS STATE
Much like the problems involved in international water pollution
disputes at the inter-state level, satisfactory solutions to transboundary
pollution are difficult to achieve.99 Historically, common law nuisance and
trespass actions served as viable dispute resolution tools in inter-state

91. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569, 784. Common law has clearly stated that
federal regulation trumps any state regulation concerning pollution concerns. Id. This concept
was first decided in Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 423-26 (1925),
where the Supreme Court held that federal law trumps state law on any water diversion issue.
This result stems from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which gives the
federal government power to enforce an injunction against a state water outlet project, and to hold
authority over a state’s right of police power. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
93. See Steven M. Siros, Transboundary Pollution in the Great Lakes: Do Individual States
Have Any Role to Play in Its Prevention?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 287, 288 (1996) (explaining the
inherent conflict that results from the cooperative federalism system between individual states and
the federal government).
94. Id. at 288-91.
95. Id.
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000) (providing that “[i]t is the policy of Congress that the
authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter”).
97. Merrill, supra note 63, at 933.
98. Id.
99. Siros, supra note 93, at 288.
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conflicts.100 However, court decisions based on common law have been
severely restricted since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,101 where the Court held that individual
states are bound by the CWA and may not use their own nuisance laws to
sue a polluting neighbor state.102 As a consequence, Ouellette closed the
door on downstream states bringing claims based on their own nuisance
laws because doing so would violate Congress’s intent behind the enactment of the CWA.103 However, in Ouellette, the Court held that downstream states injured by the actions of the polluting upstream states may
still bring a nuisance claim under the upstream state’s nuisance laws.104
Despite this concession, after the ruling in Ouellette, many litigants appear
to feel bound by EPA-administered environmental statutes, and, therefore,
most petitioners do not bring common law or statutory nuisance claims
when federally mandated environmental statutes are involved.105 Despite
this tendency, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ouellette did
leave room for a downstream state to bring a nuisance claim as a remedy to
water pollution injuries; however, whether or not litigants see nuisance law
as a viable regulatory tool appears questionable.106
In any case, and perhaps inconsistent with the concept of state sovereignty, most water pollution abatement actions are restricted by the federal
CWA, and downstream states are precluded from controlling pollutants
originating within the upstream point-source state unless the downstream
state chooses to bring a nuisance action under the upstream state’s nuisance
law.107 After the Ouellette decision, the trend has been to move away from
nuisance remedies, and when downstream states are harmed by

100. Id. at 289.
101. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
102. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491.
103. Id. at 508.
104. Id. at 510.
105. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-95 (discussing the Ouellette decision and its effect on
nuisance law claims); see also Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 55, at 1-4 (deciding not to bring a nuisance law
cause of action).
106. Siros, supra note 93, at 209.
107. Id. at 290. Siros explains the importance of Ouellette for inter-state transboundary
disputes:
[T]he Ouellette Court emphasized the role of affected states in the permitting system
as being subordinate to that of the source state, with the only available remedy being
the affected state’s ability to petition the Environmental Protection Agency . . .
[because the] [a]pplication of an affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also
would undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit
system.
Id. (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496) (final alteration in original).
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transboundary pollution, as the State of Minnesota claimed to be in People,
those states often feel their only option is to look to federal remedies rather
than direct state-level regulation.108
IV. THE SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
In response to the groundswell of popular support for environmental
protection and conservation, Congress enacted the landmark National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969,109 which requires federal
agencies to take environmental concerns into account when the agency
implements any federally funded program that could have a significant
impact on the environment.110 NEPA corresponds in many ways to the
Canadian federal statute mandating environmental assessment, the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).111
The key difference between NEPA and the CWA is that, rather than
using a traditional regulatory approach in dealing with individual polluters
such as business and industry, NEPA instead delegates decision-making
authority to individual federal agencies such as the EPA.112 NEPA requires
that the EPA, to the “fullest extent possible,” must consider alternatives to
its actions with the aim of reducing environmental impact.113 In practice,
NEPA is applied on a case-by-case basis, where federal and cooperating
state agencies are required to assess the environmental impacts and the

108. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-95 (discussing the Ouellette decision and its effect on
nuisance law claims); see also Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 1-5 (making no mention of a nuisance law
claim).
109. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) [hereinafter NEPA].
Section 4321, entitled “Congressional Declaration of Purpose,” reads:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Policy.
Id.
110. Id. § 4332. The section is entitled: “Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of
information; recommendations; international and national coordination of efforts.” Id.
111. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 855; Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch.
37 (1985).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
113. Id. § 4332(C)(iii).
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particular benefits of each action in terms of which actions are least likely
to adversely effect the environment.114
This assessment process involves considering the general environmental impact of any planned action through an EIS.115 All federal
agencies are required to conduct an EIS for any major federal action that
could significantly affect the quality of the environment.116 The EIS must
include a detailed statement of environmental impact,117 alternatives to the
proposed action,118 and any irretrievable commitments of resources
involved.119 Finally, an EIS applies to any federally funded environmental
project that presents potential pollution concerns.120
Under any case-by-case approach, the federal government has
stipulated that NEPA impact assessments are also intended to cover the
transboundary effects of all federal actions.121 A NEPA assessment is to be
applied to any proposed federal action which may have transboundary
pollution effects, because of the “worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems.”122 Furthermore, NEPA directs federal agencies
to assist other countries in preventing any transboundary water pollution.123
To this end, NEPA requires that federal agencies assess environmental
impact to the extent that it may be reasonably foreseeable.124
However, as indicated below, the NEPA-mandated environmental
impact statement (EIS) requirement has been somewhat undermined by the
CWA’s delegation of power, under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit system, to individual states.125 The
NPDES permit program allows individual states to prepare their own
functional equivalent of a federal EIS if a state project is funded, not by the

114. Id. § 4332.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 4332(C).
118. Id. § 4332(C)(iii).
119. Id. § 4332(C)(v).
120. Id. § 4332(C).
121. Id. § 4332(F). The statute provides:
The Federal Government Shall: recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the
quality of mankind’s world environment.
Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 849. All governmental bodies must be aware of the
potential impacts of federal actions on transboundary watersheds. Id. at 850.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
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federal government, but by purely state dollars.126 Thus, although an EIS is
still technically required of all federally funded projects, states can
circumvent the requirement by applying for a CWA permit, and in turn,
developing their own environmental impact analysis document and
completely funding a project on their own.127
B. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In 1972, following the precepts of NEPA, Congress enacted a more
regulatory statute, the Clean Water Act (CWA),128 which prohibits all
environmentally damaging discharges of pollutants from non-permit exempted point sources 129 into the “navigable waters” of the United States.130
The CWA is the most comprehensive source of federal regulatory authority
overseeing water pollution.131 Adopting a lofty, and arguably cost-blind
goal, the opening passages of the CWA dictate that “the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,” and that the
enforcing authority is to work towards the “protection and propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and . . . recreation in and on that water.”132 This
sweeping set of legislation came in response to Congress’s recognition that
pollution could have severely deleterious effects on the environment,
diminishing recreational and economic opportunities, while posing clear
threats to public health.133 Additionally, § 1311134 of the CWA imposes

126. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (discussing the responsibilities of state agencies, and the
federal government’s responsibility to oversee that states comply with the statute); see also
Georgia River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1340-42 (N.D.
Ga. 2003). In Georgia River Network, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was not required to issue an EIS prior to
issuing a CWA § 1342 permit to a county water authority for the creation of a reservoir in the
State of Georgia. Id.
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). The permit program provides that “the Administrator may,
after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant . . .
notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet . . . all
applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title.” Id.
128. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). The CWA was passed in 1972 as the
“Federal Water Pollution Control Act,” and renamed the Clean Water Act in 1977. Id.
129. See id. § 1362(14) (defining the term “point source”). “The term ‘point source’ means
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.” Id.
130. See id. § 1362(7) (defining the term “navigable waters”). “The term ‘navigable waters’
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.; see also United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (endorsing a functional approach to the
definition of “navigable waters”).
131. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
133. Id. § 1251(b).
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effluent limitations on dischargers by prohibiting “the ‘discharge of a[ny]
pollutant’”135 into navigable waters, as well as requiring statewide planning
for control of pollution through the § 1342 permit program.136
C. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER THE CWA
Under the collaborative CWA system, each state choosing to
implement the CWA program must meet the minimum federal requirements
under § 1342(b), and must assume all responsibility for issuance of permits
to all point source dischargers.137 Section 1342 prohibits the discharge of
any pollutant from a point source to surface waters, except when the
discharge is covered with an NPDES permit.138 The rationale behind the
decision to allow states to develop their own environmental impact analyses
is that individual states may be in a better position to recognize and develop
the functional equivalent of an NEPA-mandated EIS statement.139 To
obtain a CWA-mandated NPDES permit, the delegated state agency must
conduct scientific studies, collect public input, and submit a report of the
agency approved plan.140 All of these requirements are similar in scope to a

134. Id. § 1311.
135. See id. § 1362(12) (defining the term “discharge of a pollutant”). The statute provides:
The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term “discharge of pollutants” each means
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any
addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
Id.
136. Id. § 1342.
137. Id. § 1342(b).
138. Id. § 1342. Congress, in § 1251(b) of the CWA, explained the reasoning behind its
decision to require a NPDES permit for individual states:
Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of primary responsibilities and
rights of States: It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in
the exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is the policy of Congress that the
States manage the construction grant program under this chapter and implement the
permit programs under sections 1342 and 1344 of this title. It is further the policy of
the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and
elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to
State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of pollution.
Id.
139. Id. § 1342. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (providing that “the Governor of each State
desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its
jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it
proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact.”).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2).
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NEPA-mandated EIS.141 Thus, to comply with the CWA agenda and goals
for the Devils Lake outlet, the North Dakota Department of Health was
required to take into account a complicated measurement of environmental
clean-up goals, while simultaneously weighing the economic impact and
the health of the state’s citizens.142
In practice, all water redirection decisions, such as the creation of the
Devils Lake outlet, where the redirection is not an inter-basin transfer, are
regulated by using the NPDES system with oversight control maintained by
the EPA.143 Section 61-28-04 of the North Dakota Century Code144 is the
mandatory statute required for state implementation of the section 1342
permit program to comply with the CWA.145 The statute designates the
Health Department as the water pollution control agency, and gives the
Department broad power to make rules governing the issuance, denial,
modification, and revocation of permits, and to hold hearings necessary for
the proper administration of the permit process.146 With the powers granted
to the North Dakota Water Commission, via the Department of Health, thus
enumerated, all that remained to be decided in People was whether the
Department complied with those requirements.147
In People, Manitoba and Minnesota contended that North Dakota did
not comply with both section 61-28-04148 and section 61-28-12 of the North
Dakota Administrative Code149 because it failed to take into account many
of the environmental concerns, including phosphorous, anti-degradation,
and the risk of biota transfer.150 It was the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
task in People to consider if this argument held any water.151
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (explaining the necessity and requirements of an “environmental
assessment” or an “environmental impact statement” under NEPA).
142. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (discussing the NPDES permit requirements). But see 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (discussing the EIS requirements).
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-04 (2005).
145. Id. § 61-28-04(12). “The department is hereby designated as the state water pollution
control agency for all purposes of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, . . . and is hereby
authorized to take all action necessary or appropriate to secure to this state the benefits of that act
and similar federal acts.” Id.
146. Id.
147. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 1, 697
N.W.2d 319, 323.
148. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 52, at 6-9.
149. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-16-01-12 (2005). The statute explains which discharges will
violate the EPA permit system. Id. Manitoba and Minnesota argued that the potential for foreign
biota transfer violated the code. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 7.
150. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 32-33, 697 N.W.2d at 331.
151. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323.
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D. THE CWA AS APPLIED TO ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: THE
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS , OR UNREASONABLE STANDARD OF
REVIEW
In 2002, pursuant to its authority granted by the EPA, the North Dakota
Water Commission applied for and was granted a North Dakota Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NDPDES) permit from the North Dakota
Department of Health.152 The Health Department conducted an initial
environmental review of the project and issued a public notice of its intent
to issue a permit for the state funded outlet.153
As required under North Dakota Administrative Code section 33-1601-01(2),154 the Health Department held two public hearings and received
comments in May 2003 which were then compiled and considered by the
North Dakota Chief of the Environmental Health, L. David Glatt.155 The
Health Department replied to all of the comments it received at the public
meetings, as well as those received in writing.156 In July 2003, Glatt
recommended issuing a permit to the Water Commission for the Sheyenne
River outlet.157 The original plan was for the outlet to begin operation in
the summer of 2005, and it would continue as implemented until June of
2008 when a review of the entire system would be required.158 The Health
Department’s issuance of the permit also required “biological assessments
of the ecological condition of the Sheyenne River at four different points,
and an intake screen to prevent the transfer of adult fish species to the
Sheyenne River.”159 Furthermore, the permit would limit the operation of
the outlet to the warmer time period between May through November, and
it would prohibit any discharge of water if the elevation of Devils Lake
dipped below 1445 feet.160
The government of Manitoba, the State of Minnesota, and the environmental interest groups who opposed the approved permit filed petitions for

152. Id. ¶ 5.
153. Id. at 323-24.
154. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-16-01-01(2) (2005). The North Dakota Supreme Court in
People stated that the code “require[s] notice and public participation for tentative determinations
and draft permits, a period for public comment, a requirement for responses to comments, the
preparation of fact sheets for applications, notice to appropriate government agencies, and public
hearings for applications involving significant public interest.” People to Save the Sheyenne
River, ¶ 11, 697 N.W.2d at 325.
155. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 5, 697 N.W.2d at 323-24
156. Id. at 324.
157. Id.
158. Id. ¶ 6, 697 N.W.2d at 324.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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reconsideration under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-40.161
The North Dakota Health Department then reopened the administrative
record for further comments.162 The Health Department responded to the
newly received comments, and, subsequently, decided the permit would
still be issued as originally planned.163
The Health Department’s decision to issue the permit was ultimately
upheld by the North Dakota Supreme Court in People.164 The court found
that under the highly deferential “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable”
standard of review,165 the Health Department’s findings regarding the
permit requirements were sufficient to justify the creation of the Sheyenne
River outlet.166 This standard of review established a low burden of proof
for North Dakota and paid deference to Chief Glatt’s findings.167
In reaching its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained
that the separation of powers doctrine of the North Dakota Constitution
gave it very little room to interpret the Health Department’s decision under
the circumstances of the case.168 The court reasoned that the Health
Department’s decision-making process did not constitute an adjudicative
proceeding,169 and, thus, the less deferential “preponderance of evidence”

161. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 7, 697 N.W.2d at 324.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶ 38, 697 N.W.2d at 333.
165. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323. The court explained the definition of the standard:
A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable if it is not the product of a rational
mental process by which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together for
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable interpretation. We consider the
issues raised in Manitoba’s appeal in light of that highly deferential standard of
review.
Id. ¶ 24, 697 N.W.2d at 329 (citing Little v. Traynor, 565 N.W.2d 766, 773 (N.D. 1997)).
166. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude
the Health Department’s issuance of the permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
under the statutory scheme for the issuance of this permit.” Id.
167. Id. ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 326.
168. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained the basic
premise of the separation of powers doctrine in North Dakota:
Although the Constitution does not contain a general distributing clause expressly
providing for division of governmental powers among the legislative, executive and
judicial branches, creation of those branches operates as an apportionment of the
different classes of power; as all branches derive their authority from the same
Constitution, there is an implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the
functions of the others.
People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 326 (citing City of Carrington v. Foster
County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (N.D. 1969)).
169. Id. The North Dakota Supreme court explained that “[a]n agency may dispose of any
adjudicative proceeding by informal disposition, unless otherwise prohibited by statute or rule.”
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-22).
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standard of review under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-46170
did not apply to the case, despite arguments to this effect from Manitoba,
the Minnesota Attorney General, and the environmental interest groups.171
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard was more applicable to environmental law
questions like the one at hand, because “the subject matter is complex or
technical and involves agency expertise.”172
The decision to pay deference to the Health Department’s findings left
little room for the North Dakota Supreme Court to consider the evidence,
and to overrule the decisions made by the district court and the Department
of Health.173 With such a low standard of review, it may be argued that
Manitoba’s and Minnesota’s arguments essentially fell on deaf ears.174
Though the proper standard of review was applied, the question to be asked
is, at what cost? The decision in People deferred not only to the separation
of powers doctrine and to the findings of an administrative agency, in the
form of the North Dakota Department of Health, but also to the pressure
applied by North Dakota Governor John Hoeven.175 However, such an
interpretation left little recourse for Manitoba, Minnesota, and the
environmental interest groups.176 Their last hope seemed to be either a
highly unlikely federal review by the EPA, or an improbable IJC review
under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.177

170. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (explaining that the “preponderance of
evidence” standard applies to all findings made by an administrative hearing officer in an
adjudicative proceeding); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-23. Section 23-01-23 provides that:
A permit hearing conducted for purposes of receiving public comment or an
investigatory hearing conducted under chapters 23-20.1, 23-20.3, 23-25, 23-29, 61-28,
and 61-28.1 is not an adjudicative proceeding under chapter 28-32 and is not subject
to the requirements of chapter 54-57 [which requires a preponderance of evidence
standard].
Id. (emphasis added).
171. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 52, at 6.
172. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 24, 697 N.W.2d at 328.
173. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A.
174. Id.
175. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24.
176. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A.
177. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE HOPE OF
TREATY LAW?
There is no uniform statutory environmental regulation like NEPA or
the CWA for the resolution of purely international water disputes.178
Because of this, injured parties in international transboundary disputes must
often turn to international treaty law, and more specifically, the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909.179 Unlike statutory environmental law, “[i]nternational treaties or conventions are akin to contracts in that they derive their
legal force from the consent of the parties.”180 Though the international
portion of the Devils Lake dispute concerns only Canada and the United
States, the regulation of international waterways is a source of perpetual
disagreement among nations throughout the world.181 These disputes have
almost universally sprung from the lack of recognized processes and
procedures for the creation of a uniform set of laws governing international
waterways.182 Though international treaty law exists, its actual practical
usefulness in solving disputes is often limited at best.183
A. THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY OF 1909
The Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT) is one of the oldest and most
significant treaties in existence between Canada and the United States.184
In light of the changing conditions of the American economy at the turn of
the century due to the Industrial Revolution, the United States and Canada
were both concerned with the degradation of water quality caused by
increasing amounts of industrial pollution.185 Naturally, much of the industry was located at or around large bodies of water such as the Great
Lakes.186 To rectify some of the problems caused by water pollution across
international borders, treaties like the BWT were created.187
178. Kagan, supra note 68, at 40-45.
179. Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Preamble.
180. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 1036.
181. See Michael A. Hyman, Under The Dunabe Canopy: The Future of International
Waterway Law, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (1998) (discussing the
difficulties that countries all over the world have in developing useful laws to regulate international water conflicts).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Daniel K. DeWitt, Note, Great Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 302 (1993).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 302-04; see also Great Lakes Treaty, Sept. 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2836 (discussing
the pollution problems arising out of the Great Lakes region, and providing clean-up goals for
those problems).
187. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 820.
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The Preamble to the Treaty states that it was created to “prevent
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions
which are now pending between the United States and the Dominion of
Canada.”188 However, in spite of the expansive language, the Treaty’s
actual power to effectively regulate water pollution problems has repeatedly
been questioned.189 Additionally, questions relating to the relationship
between the injury one country might incur in response to another country’s
duty to aid its own citizens remain unclear.190
One of the major problems of the BWT has to do with its lack of direct
enforceability.191 One attempt to directly enforce the BWT, as documented
in Soucheray v. Army Corps of Engineers,192 involved a dispute similar to
that of Devils Lake, where bays and tributaries of Lake Superior
overflowed due to the United States Army Corps destruction of a dam,
which in turn led to the destruction of private property.193 The federal
district court in Soucheray held that state and federal governments cannot
sue under the BWT because treaty law cannot violate an American citizen’s
constitutional rights.194 The effect of Soucheray was to mandate that all
grievances under the BWT are to be exclusively handled by the IJC.195
Thus, at least on a superficial level, the IJC is a powerful body when
considered in terms of its regulatory power over certain transboundary
disputes between Canada and the United States.196

188. Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Preamble.
189. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 322. Dewitt takes the position that the Treaty is outdated,
largely ineffectual, and lacks any real legitimacy. Id. at 324.
190. Id.
191. Id. DeWitt bemoans the power of the Treaty, stating, “[t]he present Treaty makes clear
that the Treaty itself and the IJC exist solely for the pleasure of the two governments and not for
the people.” Id. at 323.
192. 483 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Wisc. 1979).
193. Soucheray, 483 F. Supp. at 353.
194. Id. at 357. The federal district court did note an exception that might occur under the
BWT when plaintiffs claim there has been a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment: “If the Treaty of 1909 did in some way effect a taking of plaintiffs’ property, they
would have a much stronger case for the necessity of finding a way to grant them relief.
However, no taking has occurred here.” Id.
195. Id.
196. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 825-27.
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
Article IV of the BWT created the IJC to oversee all international
conflicts involving transboundary water disputes.197 In theory, this does
much in the way of solving conflicts similar to that of Devils Lake.198 The
IJC is a bi-national body comprised of six commissioners, three appointed
by the United States and three by Canada.199 The IJC commissioners
describe the function of the IJC as “pursuing the common good of both
countries as an independent and objective adviser to the two governments.”200 Whether or not the IJC has adequately proven its ability to solve
conflicts remains in question.201 There is, however, support for the
commission as a useful scientific body, just not as a decision making one.202
The BWT endorses two means by which the countries can address
disputes with each other: (1) submission to arbitration by the IJC; or (2) a
reference for the opinion of the IJC.203 A binding ruling can be obtained by
arbitration for either party, but the submission to arbitration may only be
made upon the consent of both the United States and Canada.204
Manitoba has argued for an IJC overview of the entire Devils Lake
project.205 However, North Dakota and the federal government have not
given their full consent for this type of review.206 Manitoba has argued that

197.
198.
199.
200.

Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article VII.
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 825-27.
Id.
INT’L JOINT COMM’N, HANDBOOK ON ORIGIN, MANDATE, FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE,
PROCEDURES, POLICIES, PRACTICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2000). Article VIII of the BWT
explains that the IJC is to oversee the precedence of uses:
The following order of precedence shall be observed among the various uses
enumerated hereinafter for these waters, and no use shall be permitted which tends
materially to conflict with or restrain any other use which is given preference over it in
this order of precedence:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purpose of
navigation;
(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.
Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article VIII.
201. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 308, 313.
202. Id. at 310.
203. Id. at 308. DeWitt explains that much of the IJC’s power comes from Article X of the
BWT: “If the two countries both give their consent, issues can be handed to the IJC for binding
arbitral determination. This time, if a tie results, reports are sent to the two governments and then
an umpire is chosen. The umpire has the power to render a final decision.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
204. Id.
205. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.
206. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24.
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the IJC should be allowed to arbitrate under the premise that the Red River
clearly qualifies as a navigable water flowing across the international
boundary, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the BWT.207 Under this
rationale, the United States is bound by the BWT to not allow any pollution
to injure the health or property in Manitoba.208 The problem then becomes
determining how to accommodate international concerns associated with
projects in the context of larger political and legal processes.209 Up until
the August 2005 agreement,210 neither North Dakota nor Manitoba
appeared to put much faith into the negotiation process.211 Instead, both
parties seemed to see their roles as limiting the scope of the negotiations so
as not to allow them to have too great an effect on state and provincial
interests.212
V. STATE VERSUS STATE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Transboundary disputes on a purely inter-state level pose altogether
different problems and solutions in comparison to an international
dispute.213 International treaties like the BWT obviously have no effect on
the dispute between North Dakota and Minnesota, at least on a purely state
level.214 However, much like an international dispute, North Dakota and
Minnesota are still confined to federal environmental law as mandated by
the EPA, and more specifically, the CWA permit system that exists between
the EPA and the individual states.215 Generally, the federal government, in
the form of the EPA, has the final authority over all environmental law
questions.216 This is because states cannot pass environmental regulations

207. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.
208. Id.; see also Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article II
(explaining the rights and remedies held by both countries).
209. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24.
210. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2.
211. See McKenna, supra note 53, at A27 (discussing Manitoba’s view concerning the
Devils Lake dispute). But see Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing North Dakota’s view
concerning the Devils Lake dispute). The respective government officials of both North Dakota
and Manitoba recognize that there is a substantial problem, and that North Dakota needs to do
something to help its citizens. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. However, both sides have
historically disagreed on the solution to that problem. Id.
212. See Rebuffoni, supra note 8, at 22A (explaining that the Devils Lake agreement came at
the end of fourteen years of conflict, and only two months after the final decision in People).
213. Siros, supra note 93, at 288.
214. Id. at 303.
215. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (explaining the NPDES permit program as it applies to
individual states).
216. Id. § 1342(b).
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that are binding over the actions of other states or nations.217 Thus, states
harmed by transboundary pollution from other states might choose to look
to other remedies other than direct CWA regulation.218 Nuisance and
trespass actions were two formerly relied upon solutions, but, as we have
seen above, common law tort actions have been restricted by recent court
decisions.219
A. HISTORICAL COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Prior to the landmark environmental legislation passed in the 1970s,
common law, and more specifically nuisance and trespass torts, was the
primary resource for transboundary dispute resolution in the United States
legal system.220 Nuisance221 and trespass law222 have a long history,
stemming from a body of law whose definition could essentially be reduced
to invasions of interests in the use and enjoyment of land.223 Early nuisance
law held actors strictly liable when their actions interfered with property
rights held by others,224 which was a precursor to the strict liability mandated by the CWA today.225
In a state-level dispute, public rather than private nuisance law most
often comes into play.226 An interesting example of an early common law
217. See Siros, supra note 93, at 288 (stating that “[t]his is a result of: (1) state sovereignty;
and (2) federal preemption of state environmental laws”).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 288-89.
220. Id. at 288-92.
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NUISANCE § 40 (1965) (explaining the
historical and common law evolution of the tort doctrine of nuisance as it relates to trespass).
222. See id. § 159 (imposing liability for “Intrusions Upon, Beneath, and Above Surface of
Earth”).
223. Id. § 40.
224. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73.
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (defining “Public Nuisance”).
The Restatement provides:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public
right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to
know, has a significant effect upon the public right.
Id.
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public nuisance action is the 1923 case North Dakota v. Minnesota,227
where the United States Supreme Court used trespass law as its rationale for
determining that Minnesota did not pollute North Dakota’s waters.228 North
Dakota sought to stop Minnesota from continuing to use a system of drainage ditches constructed by Minnesota and to receive monetary compensation for damages to North Dakota farms, public roads, and bridges caused
by the overflow of a river allegedly due to the construction and operation of
the ditches.229 The Supreme Court held that Minnesota was not responsible
for any overflow or damage to North Dakota because, although damage did
occur, Minnesota’s first obligation was to its own citizens.230 At this point
in the history of American jurisprudence, the general rationale was to allow
individual states to help their own citizens, even at the expense of neighboring states.231 It was under this rationale that the Supreme Court found
that Minnesota was not liable for any flooding damage to North Dakota.232
This early decision employing common law nuisance and trespass torts
is a telling example of the Supreme Court’s early rationale involving statelevel transboundary disputes.233 Much like the North Dakota Supreme
Court in People,234 the United States Supreme Court in North Dakota v.
Minnesota paid deference to the opinions and decisions of experts in the
field.235

227. 263 U.S. 365 (1923).
228. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388.
229. Id. at 371-72.
230. Id. at 388.
231. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73.
232. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388.
233. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73 (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of public
nuisance was used most frequently in the early [English] common law to prosecute those who
obstructed public highways or encroached on the royal domain”).
234. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 38, 697
N.W.2d 319, 333. The North Dakota Supreme Court’s “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable”
standard of review paid deference to the North Dakota Department of Health and Water
Commission for decisions that require complicated scientific and technical knowledge. Id. ¶ 24,
697 N.W.2d at 329; see also North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388. Chief Justice Taft explained the
United States Supreme Court’s reasoning:
The conclusion we have come to on the main issue of fact that Minnesota is not
responsible for the floods of which complaint is made, makes it unnecessary for us to
consider this evidence as to a practical remedy for them, and requires us to leave the
opinions and suggestions of the expert engineers for the consideration of the two
States in a possible effort by either or both to remedy existing conditions in this basin.
Id. (emphasis added).
235. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388.
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B. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS: NUISANCE ACTIONS IN LIGHT
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
When the federal government enacted the CWA, common law tort
actions lost a great deal of their former significance in remedying state
versus state disputes.236 In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the United
States Supreme Court effectively abolished the traditional state common
law nuisance or trespass actions seen in North Dakota v. Minnesota, in
favor of water pollution being regulated by the CWA.237
In Ouellette, the issue before the Court was whether the CWA
preempted a state’s use of its own common law definitions of nuisance to
impose liability on another state’s point source.238 The State of New York
had granted a permit to the International Paper Company to discharge
pollutants into a waterway that the crossed the boundary between New
York and Vermont.239 The issuance of the permit would have resulted in
pollution being released into the waterway, subsequently affecting the
quality of the water entering Vermont.240 As a result, interested parties in
Vermont attempted to utilize Vermont’s nuisance common law to impose
liability on the New York point source.241
The Supreme Court in Ouellette examined whether Vermont’s common
law action had any role in light of the regulatory scheme of the CWA. 242
The Court noted that, as was decided in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,243 the
CWA had established a sophisticated system of water pollution regulation
to be used in transboundary water disputes.244 Keeping this in mind, the
Ouellette Court reasoned that the affected state’s position in the permit

236. Siros, supra note 93, at 291-92.
237. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484-86 (1987); see City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 304-05 (1981) (serving as the precursor decision for Ouellette); see also
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 91 (1992). In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, Oklahoma challenged
the permit before the EPA on grounds that the discharge violated Oklahoma’s water quality
standards. 503 U.S. at 91. The Court held that an affected state’s only recourse was to apply to
the EPA administrator, who then had the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concluded that
the discharges would have an undue impact on interstate waters, pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
Id. at 111-14. The Supreme Court stated that the CWA made it clear that affected states occupy a
subordinate position to source states in the federal regulatory program. Id.
238. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483.
239. Id. at 483-84.
240. Id. at 484.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 484-85.
243. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
244. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981)). The Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee concluded that with the passage of the CWA,
Congress intended the EPA to handle all pollution regulation, leaving no room for federal
common law nuisance actions. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 310.
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system was subordinate to that of the state who applied for a permit.245 In
its explanation, the Supreme Court concluded that an “application of an
affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also would undermine the
important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.”246
Thus, Vermont’s common law could not be used to impose liability on a
New York point source.247
Under the holding of Ouellette, it is clear that Minnesota can no more
control North Dakota’s permitting program through its own nuisance laws
than North Dakota could pass a law directly taxing Minnesota’s
residents.248 Within a state’s borders, each state determines its own rules of
law and policies of social and industrial regulation.249 Thus, many injured
parties appear to believe that nuisance law has been rendered obsolete by
the § 1342 NPDES permit program, and that any state looking for recourse
in water pollution disputes would be wise to look only to federal statutory
law.250 However, the ruling in Ouellette left open the door for a petitioner
to bring a nuisance complaint under the law of the state which had applied
for, and was granted, a NPDES permit.251 Thus, in the Devils Lake scenario, Minnesota and Manitoba still had the option of bringing a nuisance
claim under North Dakota law.252 The question becomes: Why didn’t they?
Although the answer to this question is not entirely clear, perhaps it can be
explained by the general reluctance of parties to bringing nuisance claims
after the Ouellette decision.253 This may explain why a nuisance suit was
not brought by any of the suing parties in People.254
Despite the apparent reluctance to utilize another states’ nuisance law,
there are scholars who argue in favor of using nuisance laws as a viable
remedy to transboundary water pollution.255 Indeed, the United States

245. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491.
246. Id. at 496.
247. Id. at 497.
248. Siros, supra note 93, at 288.
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (granting states the right to govern their own
citizens).
250. Id.
251. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 481-85.
252. Id.
253. See Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 4-10 (failing to argue for a nuisance law remedy).
254. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 7, 697
N.W.2d 319, 324.
255. Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water Act as a Means
of Enhancing Environmental Protection, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 196-98 (1996) (arguing
that “[c]urrent societal interest in the property rights movement, state sovereignty, accountability,
and regulatory efficiency have been used to undermine environmental protection at the federal
level. However, incorporating these same values into a revised approach to preemption analysis
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Supreme Court in Ouellette specifically held that nuisance law may still be
used in cases of environmental pollution.256 In theory, North Dakota’s
nuisance law257 provides the same potential remedy for pollution complaints as does Minnesota’s nuisance law.258 Although the appellants in
People did not choose to bring a nuisance claim against North Dakota, their
decision not to do so does not preclude other interested parties from
choosing to act differently.259 Therefore, although nuisance law after
Ouellette appears to be disfavored, nuisance law’s mandate of strict
liability, and its potential for injunctive relief, make it a viable and perhaps
powerful tool for transboundary water pollution disputes.260
VI. THE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The August 2005 agreement between Manitoba and North Dakota
seems to indicate an end to the Devils Lake dispute.261 Barring an improbable review by the IJC, Manitoba and Minnesota have little choice but to
accept the decision handed down in People.262 For this reason, Manitoba
has tried to make the best of the situation by agreeing with North Dakota to
cooperate in the design and construction of the Sheyenne River outlet.263

could enhance environmental protection . . .”); see also Kathleen Roth, Note, A Landowner’s
Remedy Laid to Waste: State Preemption of Private Nuisance Claims Against Regulated Pollution
Sources, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 423 (1996) (arguing that “[t]o apply the
permit as an across-the-board preclusion of private nuisance remedies unfairly imposes the burden
of industry discharges on the parties harmed by this pollution and invites abuse from unscrupulous
sources”).
256. Lininger, supra note 255, at 193; Roth, supra note 255, at 423.
257. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01 (2005) (defining nuisance).
A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act or omitting to perform a duty, which
act or omission:
1. Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others;
2. Offends decency;
3. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, navigable river, bay, stream, canal, basin, public
park, square, street, or highway; or
4. In any way renders other persons insecure in life or in the use of property.
Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-07 (2005) (explaining that the potential remedies for
public nuisance complaints are: “1. Indictment; 2. Filing an information; 3. Bringing a criminal
action before a district court judge; 4. A civil action; or 5. Abatement”).
258. See Roth, supra note 255, at 420-23 (arguing that nuisance law is still a viable remedy
for injured parties).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2.
262. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A.
263. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2.
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The agreement is not completely without merit for Manitoba, for it
contains a certain number of concessions made by North Dakota.264 For
example, the outlet will use a more sophisticated filtration system by
incorporating a rock and gravel filter to clock the release of “macroscopic
aquatic nuisance species.”265 Furthermore, the IJC has created the
International Red River Board to develop and implement a shared-risk
management strategy for the greater Red River Basin, with the goal of
creating an “early detection and monitoring system for water quality and
aquatic nuisance species throughout the Basin.”266 Additionally, Manitoba
will be allowed to construct a dike on the Red River near the international
border at Pembina, North Dakota.267 The dike will “provide for water
monitoring downstream to help prevent invasive species, nitrogen and
phosphorus from crossing the border.”268 Finally, North Dakota and
Manitoba have agreed to:
Share and review prior scientific work studying the potential for
“aquatic nuisance species,” such as invasive fish or plants, and
parasites; [j]ointly conduct a rapid bio-assessment of the Lake by
20 biologists from the U.S. and Canada to enhance our collective
understanding of Lake organisms; [and] [d]evelop shared
strategies to protect the broader Red River Basin from future risk
of aquatic nuisance species that might pose a significant risk to the
Basin.269
Clearly, the agreement has helped to assuage some of the most embattled
issues and does result in some tangible benefits for Manitoba.270
As the agreement demonstrates, cost-benefit and risk-benefit analyses
have become a standard part of environmental policy decisions.271 In order
to determine whether a proposed governmental regulation may actually lead
to the improvement of public welfare, it is often necessary to subject the
policy to an analysis of the overall benefits of the proposed regulation in
comparison with any possible injurious effects the initiative could have on
the environment.272 On one hand, we can weigh the social benefit of the

264. Id.
265. Id
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Krauss, supra note 9, at 1.
269. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1.
270. Id. But see Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A (discussing the State of Minnesota’s
lingering concerns and feelings of exasperation at not being included in the negotiation process).
271. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 29.
272. Id.
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policy, and on the other hand, we can examine the environmental cost.273
Somewhere in the middle lies economic cost.274 Naturally, trade-offs must
always be made.275
The ramifications of the Devils Lake dispute have long-term
consequences for not only the immediate residents of North Dakota, but
also for other transboundary disputes on a national and global scale.276 In
the Devils Lake scenario, it is improbable that anyone would argue that the
federal government and North Dakota do not have an obligation to help the
citizens of North Dakota to cope with the massive structural and monetary
damage caused by the flooding.277 However, it may also be argued that it
was the residents of North Dakota who encroached on the lake and not vice
versa.278
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INCREASE THE SCOPE AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE
BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
As should be clear from this Note, a certain body of treaty law already
exists on these points; however, its effectiveness is noticeably lacking.279
Without more powerful treaty law, the resolution of international water
disputes becomes enmeshed in a slew of negotiations and arbitrations, often
without real solutions.280 One answer to this dilemma is to increase the
authority of the BWT.281 This could be accomplished by requiring that all
international water disputes be automatically subject to an IJC review.282

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 858.
276. Siros, supra note 93, at 288.
277. See Krauss, supra note 19 at 17 (discussing the August 2005 agreement).
278. See FEMA Report, supra note 20 (discussing the need for a federal flood insurance
program to help home owners relocate their homes away from the flooding lake which has long
been recognized as having little or no natural drainage basin).
279. See DeWitt, supra note 184, at 323 (emphasizing the need for changes to the BWT).
DeWitt calls for two changes to make the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 more effective:
The first is to rewrite the Treaty in a way that fundamentally changes its nature as a
tool of the governments to being an “environmental pledge” to the people. This first
proposal gives no new specific power to the IJC, but for the reasons set out below, will
substantially increase the IJC’s influence. The second proposal is to establish a
“science judgment board” to settle scientific discrepancies and encourage scientific
research throughout the basin.
Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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Additionally, making the IJC more of a regulatory authority would solve
many problems because it would eliminate the need for appeals for review,
via either forced diplomacy or polemical editorials in national newspapers
like the New York Times.283 Finally, because the BWT was enacted in
1909, an argument can and has been made that it is outdated.284 Perhaps it
is time for the respective governments of the United States and Canada to
discuss potential changes to the Treaty that would enable the governments
to more ably cope with transboundary disputes in the twenty-first
century.285
B. INCREASE THE BURDEN ON THE PERMIT OPERATOR AND/OR
OVERSIGHT BY THE EPA
The federal government should not completely ignore international
transboundary water disputes merely by delegating authority to the states or
provinces, essentially washing its hands of the matter.286 Under the § 1342
permit program, the EPA is required to work with the states in implementation and regulation under the permit.287 This is the goal of a system of
cooperative federalism.288
In both international and domestic law, therefore, a general failure to
develop an effective central strategy for regulating transboundary pollution
is manifest.289 Case-by-case approaches based on international law or
American common law have failed to address the problem in a rigorous and
useful manner.290 As a consequence, no specific legal norms have been
283. See Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute); McKenna, supra note 53, at
A27 (discussing the dispute). Crossfire in the media, such as that between the Ambassador of
Manitoba, McKenna, and North Dakota Governor John Hoeven, is a telling example of the lengths
to which government officials from competing countries must go to in light of the lack of
powerful dispute-solving treaty law. See Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute);
McKenna, supra note 53, at A27 (discussing the dispute). Additionally, the publication of
editorials in the New York Times puts the Devils Lake issue into the spotlight on an international
level, a ploy which is sure to catch the attention of government officials like United States
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who might be swayed to lobby for an IJC review. See
Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute); McKenna, supra note 53, at A27
(discussing the dispute).
284. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 323.
285. Id.
286. Siros, supra note 93, at 288.
287. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
288. Siros, supra note 93, at 311. As Siros points out, there is some hope under recent case
law that the EPA may be taking steps to become more involved in the permit process; however, he
expresses skepticism: “Unfortunately, this in and of itself, is not enough. The discretion granted
the EPA should be restricted, and when an affected state can show a significant interference with a
water . . . quality standard, the EPA should be required to take action.” Id.
289. Id.; see DeWitt, supra note 184, at 302 (discussing the problems of the current
American system of cooperative federalism).
290. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 302.
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created.291 One solution is to include more state and province representatives in the international negotiations.292
C. REQUIRE THAT ALL STATE IMPLEMENTED CWA PERMITS BE
ISSUED ONLY AFTER AN ADJUDICATIVE HEARING HAS BEEN
HELD
Requiring that every NPDES permit, in terms of those permits issued
by state agencies such as the North Dakota Department of Health in People,
be issued only after an adjudicative proceeding has been held, would ensure
that all contested viewpoints are satisfactorily considered.293 Perhaps the
principal argument in favor of requiring an adjudicative proceeding for all
issuances of NPDES permits is that the higher “preponderance of the
evidence” standard of judicial review would necessarily be applied by
appellate courts when reviewing an agency’s decision to grant a permit. 294
This argument has persuasive merit as explained by the Court in People,
who found that under the North Dakota Administrative Procedures Act, the
Act generally defines the issuance of permits to require an adjudicative
proceeding.295 However, the CWA, as applied to North Dakota through
North Dakota Century Code section 23-01-23, circumvents the
Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement, and instead allows states to
grant permits through informal rulemaking where the “arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable” standard of review is to be applied to all agency decisions
made within their discretion and at the behest of Congress.296

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453-60 (1989) (arguing that the delegation doctrine
of the United States Constitution does not permit the current level of deference that courts give to
most administrative agency decisions).
294. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (requiring that appellate courts utilize the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard for all adjudicative proceedings held before an
administrative agency).
295. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 13, 697
N.W.2d 319, 325.
296. Id. ¶ 19, 697 N.W.2d at 327. The North Dakota Supreme Court explained their decision
to use the “arbitrary and capricious standard of review,” stating that:
Section 23-01-23, N.D.C.C., was enacted in 1995 to specifically preclude application
of the ‘contested case’ procedural requirements of the Administrative Agencies
Practice Act to environmental permit hearings conducted for the purpose of receiving
public comment, because the potential cost requirements for contested case procedures
for those type of permit hearings would be ‘astronomical’.
Id. (citing Hearing on Senate Bill 2154 before Senate Judiciary Committee, 54th N.D. Legis. Sess.
(Jan. 11, 1995) (testimony of William J. Delmore, Assistant Attorney General for Environmental
Section of Health Department)).
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Therefore, in People, the North Dakota Supreme Court correctly
applied the “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” standard of review to the
North Dakota Department of Health’s decision to issue the permit without
an adjudicative proceeding, and the Court thereby ensured not to offend the
North Dakota Legislature or North Dakota Governor John Hoeven.297 The
Department of Health was only required to adhere to informal rulemaking
procedures as required by section 23-01-23,298 and, therefore, the agency’s
notice of and conducting of the two public hearings was found to be
sufficient.299
However, Manitoba and the public interest groups appealed the suit to
the North Dakota Supreme Court to be heard on its merits, which, it may be
argued, was not done.300 This is not to say that courts should take it upon
themselves to become policy makers; it is only to suggest that perhaps
Congress was either not clear enough, or too permissive, in delineating
which specifications need to be met when applying for and implementing
the CWA permit system.301 However, in the main, the courts are not to
blame in this matter.302 To be fair, a lobbying effort to change the standard
of review might make more sense.303 Perhaps the myriad of environmental
special interest groups like those in People could take up this cause.304
D. REVISIT THE ORIGINAL RATIONALE FOR NUISANCE LAW
Pollution that originates in one state and spills over into another is very
difficult for either jurisdictional authority to regulate effectively.305 The
affected state may not be able to obtain jurisdiction over actors in the source
state, or, if it can obtain jurisdiction, the affected state may have difficulties

297. Id. ¶ 19, 27 697 N.W.2d at 327, 330.
298. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-23 (2005) (providing that a permit hearing is not an
adjudicative hearing).
299. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 20, 697
N.W.2d 319, 327.
300. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (explaining
that on appeal from an adjudicative proceeding made before an administrative agency, courts are
to scrutinize the record made before the agency to determine if the agency’s decision was lawful).
301. See Farina, supra note 293, at 453-60 (arguing that complete deference should not be
given to an administrative agency when Congress’s intention behind the statute is ambiguous).
302. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 550-60 (1985) (discussing the benefits of judicial deference to administrative agencies).
303. Id.
304. See id. at 574-75 (arguing that legislators, as opposed to the courts, have gained indepth knowledge of the reasoning behind the enactment of a statute which renders them more
qualified to define the particular meaning of their own words).
305. See Siros, supra note 93, at 288-90 (offering a useful discussion of the problems that
often arise in transboundary disputes).
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enforcing its statutes.306 Because of the shift in regulation stemming from
the permit process in the CWA, states like Minnesota appear to no longer
see using nuisance law as a viable option for this type of transboundary
water dispute.307 However, Minnesota and Manitoba still had the option of
bringing a claim under North Dakota’s nuisance laws.308 The United States
Supreme Court opinion in Ouellette left open the opportunity for injured
downstream parties, or in the case at hand, Minnesota and Manitoba, to
utilize a tort law nuisance action.309 For whatever reason, and despite the
availability of North Dakota’s nuisance laws, many parties appear not to
believe that nuisance law is a viable solution to transboundary water
disputes.310 However, there are scholars who insist that, despite the modern
use of federal preemption through federal statutes like the CWA, there is
still potential for a rebirth of nuisance law being a viable remedy for injured
downstream parties.311 Public nuisance law was used for hundreds of years
in English common law jurisprudence, and subsequently adopted by
American courts as a means for regulating water disputes.312 Though the
CWA essentially mandates strict liability, true liability of polluters becomes
muddled in a permit system which prevents some, but not all, discharges of
polluting waste. 313

306. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 481-85 (1987).
307. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-92 (explaining the demise of nuisance law as an
effective regulatory tool). The amicus brief filed by the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, and the Minnesota Attorney General makes
no mention of nuisance law. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 55, at 4.
308. See Roth, supra note 255, at 423 (explaining that the federal CWA preempts only
nuisance laws of the complaining downstream state, but not the upstream point-source state).
309. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484-86 (1987).
310. See Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 4.
311. See Lininger, supra note 255, at 195-98 (discussing federal preemption of state laws
under the CWA); see also Roth, supra note 255, at 420-23 (discussing federal preemption of state
laws under the CWA).
312. Siros, supra note 93, at 289.
313. Id. at 295-97.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
When the North Dakota Department of Health, in its capacity as an
administrative body, carefully adheres to the proper regulations of the EPAdelegated permit system under the CWA, there is no doubt that the State of
North Dakota has the legal right to create and use the Sheyenne River outlet
to combat the flooding of Devils Lake.314 The purpose of government is to
give citizens a legal outlet to identify problems and create solutions.315
Sometimes those means come at a cost. As the population grows and
humans expand further and further into their environments, there is a point
at which man-made reconstruction of natural processes will take its toll.316
Of course, there is always a cost-benefit analysis to be employed, but time
and again, it seems as though the environment sees fewer of the benefits
and much more of the cost.317
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314. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 38, 697
N.W.2d 319, 333.
315. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 9-24.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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